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Abstract
Modern science began as natural philosophy. In the time of Newton, what we call
science and philosophy today – the disparate endeavours – formed one mutually
interacting, integrated endeavour of natural philosophy: to improve our knowledge and
understanding of the universe, and to improve our understanding of ourselves as a part of
it. Profound, indeed unprecedented discoveries were made. But then natural philosophy
died. It split into science on the one hand, and philosophy on the other. This happened
during the 18th and 19th centuries, and the split is now built into our intellectual
landscape. But the two fragments, science and philosophy, are defective shadows of the
glorious unified endeavour of natural philosophy. Rigour, sheer intellectual good sense
and decisive argument demand that we put the two together again, and rediscover the
immense merits of the integrated enterprise of natural philosophy. This requires an
intellectual revolution, with dramatic implications for how we understand our world, how
we understand and do science, and how we understand and do philosophy. There are
dramatic implications, too, for education, and for the entire academic endeavour, and its
capacity to help us discover how to tackle more successfully our immense global
problems.
1. Natural Philosophy and Its Death
Modern science began as natural philosophy – or “experimental philosophy” as it was
sometimes called. In the time of Isaac Newton, in the 17th century, science was not only
called “natural philosophy”. It was conceived of, and pursued, as a development of
philosophy. It brought together physics, chemistry and other branches of natural science
as we know it today, with diverse branches of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology,
methodology, philosophy of science – even theology. Science and philosophy, which we
see today as distinct, in those days interacted with one another and formed the integrated
enterprise of natural philosophy.1 This had, as its basic aim, to improve our knowledge
and understanding of the universe – and to improve our understanding of ourselves as a
part of the universe. And around the time of Newton there was this great upsurge of
excitement and confidence. For the first time ever, in the history of humanity, the secrets
of the universe, hitherto wholly unknown, had been revealed and laid bare for all to
understand – or at least, for all those who understood Latin and the intricate mathematics
of Newton’s Principia.
Today we look back at the great intellectual figures associated with the birth of modern
science and we unhesitatingly divide them up into scientists on the one hand,
philosophers on the other. Galileo, Johannes Kepler, William Harvey, Robert Boyle,
Christiaan Huygens, Robert Hooke, Edmond Halley, and of course Isaac Newton are all
scientists; Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Baruch Spinoza
and Gottfried Leibniz are philosophers. But this division is anachronistic. They did not
see themselves in this fashion. Their work interacted in all sorts of ways, science with
philosophy, philosophy with science. They all sought, in one way or another, to improve
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we can acquire knowledge of the universe, and to work out the implications, for our
understanding of ourselves, of the new view of the universe that the new natural
philosophy had ushered in.
There were good reasons why, in the 17th century, empirical science could not be split
off from philosophy. Natural philosophers disagreed about crucial questions of method.
Should evidence alone decide what theories are accepted and rejected, or does reason
play a role as well? Different views about method had practical consequences for science
itself: they had to be discussed as a part of science. Again, the new natural philosophy
ushered in a new vision of the universe: it is made up of colourless, soundless, odourless
corpuscles which interact only by contact. This metaphysical view had an impact on
what scientific theories are to be accepted and rejected; natural philosophers held
different versions of the view, and different attitudes to the influence the view should
have on science: all this had to be discussed as an integral part of science. And again, the
corpuscular hypothesis provoked profound philosophical problems about how it is
possible for human beings to acquire knowledge of the universe, and how it is possible
for people to be conscious, free and of value if immersed in the physical universe.
Natural philosophers, of a more “philosophical” bent, grappled with these problems
thrown up by the new vision of the universe.
And then, during the 18th and 19th centuries, natural philosophy died. It split into
empirical science on the one hand, and philosophy on the other. Increasingly, scientists
ignored philosophy, and philosophers ignored science. The two parts, pursued more or
less independently of one another, lack the rigour and the intellectual value of the
integrated enterprise of natural philosophy, as we shall see in what follows. Science and
philosophy are pale shadows of the unified and glorious enterprise that gave birth to
them, natural philosophy.
2. When and Why did Natural Philosophy Die?
Two major factors led to the death of natural philosophy, to its splintering into science
and philosophy. First, Newton’s ideas about method, as set out in the Principia, had an
immense impact.2 Natural philosophers began to take for granted that they had in their
possession an assured method for the acquisition of knowledge. This involved basing
everything on evidence. Evidence alone provided the means for deciding what should be
accepted and rejected in natural philosophy, or in science as it came to be called, and
anything not amenable to empirical testing had no place in science. Secondly, the failure
of natural philosophers to solve the philosophical problems associated with the new
vision of the universe associated with the new natural philosophy led to philosophy being
developed in ways which became more and more unrelated to, and irrelevant to, science.
Attitudes developed in both science and in philosophy intensified the rupture, and tore
natural philosophy apart.
When did natural philosophy die? It began to die almost immediately after its birth, as
“philosophers” became increasingly remote from the outlook, thought and work of
“scientists”. This process continued throughout the 18th century, and became confirmed
in the 19th century. In 1833, William Whewell coined the term “scientist”.
I take the above two reasons for the death of natural philosophy in turn, in the next two
sections.
33. Newton and Empiricism
Once Newtonian science was generally accepted, in England and especially in France,
those natural philosophers who did what we today call science felt confident that the
correct methods for natural science had been firmly established, were well known and
required no more discussion. They were the methods set out by Newton in his “rules of
reasoning in philosophy” in his Principia. Science is based on evidence. The scientist
must base all his theorizing on observation and experiment. Not only did this mean
scientists need no longer discuss questions of method as an integral part of science. It
meant philosophy could play no role in science whatsoever, for of course philosophy is
concerned with ideas that are not empirically testable, not based on evidence. General
acceptance of a view that may be called standard empiricism, stemming from Newton,
and from Francis Bacon and Locke, had a major role, then, in driving a wedge between
science on the one hand, philosophy on the other – the demise of natural philosophy
being the consequence. Standard empiricism, in one or other form, is still widely
accepted today, by scientists and non-scientists alike. In the 20th century, Karl Popper
articulated the division between science and philosophy in a striking and widely
influential way with his principle of demarcation: a theory, in order to be scientific, must
be empirically falsifiable.
4. Failings of Western Philosophy
Not only did scientists come to understand natural science in such a way that
philosophy was excluded from science. Philosophers contributed to the growing gulf
separating science from philosophy by becoming more and more remote, in their
deliberations, from anything relevant to science. This came about because philosophers
failed to come to grips with and solve – even to articulate – the fundamental
philosophical problem thrown up by the new vision of the universe associated with the
new natural philosophy. In what follows I shall argue that this problem ought to be
formulated like this: How can our human world, imbued with sensory qualities,
consciousness, free will, meaning and value, exist and best flourish embedded in the
physical universe (as conceived of by modern science)?3 Descartes came up with a
possible solution to this problem – even though he did not formulate the problem as I
have just done. His proposed solution is Cartesian dualism: there are two kinds of
entities in existence, fundamental physical entities on the one hand, minds on the other.
For leading philosophers who came after Descartes – Bishop Berkeley, David Hume,
Immanuel Kant and others – Cartesian dualism seemed to imply (in effect) that we can
only have knowledge of our minds, or of immediate experience. The long, intricate chain
of events that takes place between external object and our inner experience of it seemed
to imply that it is only the last event in this chain of events, our inner experience, that we
can be aware of. As a result, philosophy became more and more remote from science.
Experience seemed to be an impenetrable barrier between us and the physical universe, it
being impossible to acquire knowledge of the unobservable physical universe. Those
philosophers who did continue to try to understand how science acquires knowledge lost
the optimism of the 17th century natural philosophers. The optimistic question “How can
natural philosophy best acquire knowledge?” was converted into the pessimistic Kantian
question “How is natural philosophy possible at all?” The Newtonian idea that science is
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problematic. No one knew, in other words, how to solve the problem of induction – the
problem of showing how it is possible to verify theory by means of evidence.
By the 20th century, philosophy had split into two schools: so-called “analytic”
philosophy, and “Continental” philosophy. Analytic philosophers took seriously the
problem of what philosophy could be and do given it took no account of evidence, and
came to the conclusion that it must be devoted to analysis of concepts – perhaps
somewhat analogous to the way mathematics might be thought to be based on analysis of
such concepts as number, space, function, continuity, group, set. Analytic philosophers
thus took up the task of analysing key concepts of philosophy: knowledge, mind, cause,
reason, perception, consciousness, good, virtue, reality, freedom, justice, and so on.
Ideas about what philosophical analysis is have evolved since the days of G. E, Moore
and Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 20th century, but still today, most philosophers “in the
analytic tradition” take it for granted that conceptual analysis is the proper task of
philosophy.
Continental philosophy, on the other hand, emerged from, and is to be associated with,
the “mind” part of the Cartesian mind/matter dichotomy. It tends to take immediate
human experience as the basis for all thought, and is indifferent to, if not downright
hostile towards, science and reason. Johann Fichte, Georg Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche,
Søren Kiekergaard, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Michel Foucault and Jacques
Derrida are some of the figures associated with Continental philosophy. German
idealism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism, structuralism, post-structuralism,
postmodernism, and critical theory associated with the Frankfurt school are some of the
movements associated with this approach.
Neither analytic philosophy, nor Continental philosophy, have much to say that is
relevant to, or of interest to, science. And even most philosophy of science, from its
emergence in the 20th century, fails to be of interest to scientists.
There are, of course, exceptions to this story. Bertrand Russell is one; and Karl Popper
is another. But even these two figures, so sympathetic towards the scientific enterprise at
its best, conform to the general pattern of retaining the sharp distinction between science
and philosophy.4 J. J. C. Smart and others have sought to articulate the view of the
universe that emerges from modern science, and tackle the philosophical problems that
this view engenders.5 These developments, even though in the right direction, have failed
to heal the gulf between science and philosophy. Most scientists probably agree with
Steven Weinberg when he says “only rarely did it seem to me [that philosophy of science has]
anything to do with the work of science as I knew it. ... I am not alone in this; I know of no one
who has participated actively in the advance of physics in the post-war period whose research has
been significantly helped by the work of philosophers”.6 John Ziman, a physicist, was, a few
years before, even more dismissive. He declared “the Philosophy of Science ...[is] arid and
repulsive. To read the latest symposium volume on this topic is to be reminded of the Talmud, or
of the theological disputes of Byzantium”.7 Stephen Hawking at intervals pronounces very
publicly that philosophy is dead.
5. Metaphysics and Method
As I have explained, two key factors were responsible for the demise of natural
philosophy: widespread acceptance of standard empiricism – the view that science is
based exclusively on evidence – and the failure of philosophers to solve philosophical
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demonstrate that both these factors stem from quite fundamental intellectual failures.
Correct these failures, and it becomes blindingly obvious that the splitting of natural
philosophy into science on the one hand, philosophy on the other, was a profound
intellectual disaster. We urgently need to resurrect natural philosophy, thus greatly
enhancing the rigour, the intellectual and educational value, of both science and
philosophy. In this section I concentrate on the first factor (the second one is discussed in
section 6 below).
The key point to be made is that standard empiricism, despite being widely taken for
granted still by scientists and non-scientists alike, is untenable in all its varieties. The
weakest version of standard empiricism – a component of all stronger versions – can be
formulated like this. The basic aim of science is truth, the basic method being to assess
claims to knowledge impartially with respect to evidence alone. Considerations of
simplicity, unity or explanatory power may legitimately influence what theory is accepted
in addition to evidence, but not in such a way that the universe itself is assumed to be
simple, unified, or such that explanations exist to be discovered (i.e. comprehensible). In
science, no factual thesis about the world can be accepted as a part of scientific
knowledge independently of evidence, let alone in violation of evidence.
But standard empiricism, though still widely taken for granted by scientists and non-
scientists alike, is untenable. Theoretical physics persistently only accepts unified or
explanatory theories, even though endlessly many empirically more successful
disunified, non-explanatory rivals can always be concocted. This means that physics
makes a persistent, substantial metaphysical (i.e. untestable) assumption about the nature
of the universe: it is such that, at the very least, no seriously disunified, non-explanatory
theory is true.8 The universe is (more or less) physically comprehensible (i.e. such that
physical explanations for phenomena exist to be discovered). Thus physics does make a
persistent assumption about the universe independent of evidence – even, in a certain
sense, in violation of evidence – and that means standard empiricism is false.9
This big, persistent assumption exercises a profound influence over physics, in
determining, with evidence, what theories are accepted and rejected, and in influencing
the direction in which physicists look in their attempts to develop new theories. But the
assumption is, however, highly problematic and, in the more specific form accepted by
physics at any given time, is almost bound to be false. We do not know that the universe
is physically comprehensible; much less do we know it is comprehensible in the more or
less specific way physics implicitly assumes it to be at any given stage in its
development. Ideas about how the universe might be comprehensible have changed
dramatically many times during the development of science, and the chances are that
current ideas will turn out to be inadequate as well. The more or less specific assumption
as to how the universe is physically comprehensible, implicit in physics at any stage of its
development, influences both acceptance of theory, and the search for new theories, and
yet this assumption is almost bound to be false. It is, in short, important for progress in
physics that this assumption is made explicit, so that it can be critically assessed and, we
may hope, improved.
In order to do this, we need to adopt and implement a new conception of science that I
have called aim-oriented empiricism. This holds that we need to represent the
metaphysical assumptions of science in the form of a hierarchy of assumptions, and
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more such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be
possible at all, as one goes up the hierarchy. In this way, a framework of relatively
unproblematic, enduring assumptions and associated methods, high up in the hierarchy, is
created within which much more substantial and problematic assumptions and associated
methods, low down in the hierarchy, can be critically assessed and improved. Put
another way, a framework of relatively unproblematic aims and methods for science is
created within which much more problematic aims and methods can be improved. (A
basic aim of physics, according to aim-oriented empiricism, is to discover truth
problematically presupposed to be physically comprehensible.) That low-level
assumption (or that low-level aim presupposing such an assumption) is to be chosen
which (a) accords best with assumptions (or aims) higher up in the hierarchy, and (b)
sustains – or best promises to sustain – the most empirically progressive scientific
research programme. According to aim-oriented empiricism, there is something like
positive feedback between improving knowledge, and improving aims and methods –
improving knowledge-about-how-to-improve-knowledge. Physics adapts its methods to
what it discovers about the universe.10
Aim-oriented empiricism, if ever put explicitly into scientific practice, would amount
to the rebirth of natural philosophy. For aim-oriented empiricism demands that
theoretical knowledge, metaphysics, ideas concerning aims and methods – that is, ideas
in the philosophy of science – and even philosophy, all interact with one another, the key
feature of natural philosophy.
Ironically, Newton did not uphold standard empiricism. Newton formulates three of
his four rules of reasoning in such a way that it is clear that these rules make assumptions
about the nature of the universe. Thus rule 1 asserts: "We are to admit no more causes of
natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances."
And Newton adds: "To this purpose the philosophers say that nature does nothing in vain,
and more is in vain when less will serve; for Nature is pleased with simplicity, and affects
not the pomp of superfluous causes."11 Newton understood that persistently preferring
simple theories means that Nature herself is being persistently assumed to be simple
(which violates standard empiricism).
Aim-oriented empiricist natural philosophy, if ever created, would be potentially, in a
number of ways, a great improvement over what we have at present, the two dissociated
parts, science and philosophy. To begin with, the meta-methodology of aim-oriented
empiricism, facilitating evolving aims and methods of a science with evolving
knowledge, has implications for all the branches of natural science, and not just for
theoretical physics (all that we have seen so far). Aim-oriented empiricism requires
different sciences to have different methods, as a result of having different specific aims;
at the same time, it provides a unified framework for the whole enterprise of natural
science – or, rather, of natural philosophy. 12 Aim-oriented empiricism is a more rigorous
conception of science than standard empiricism because it acknowledges, and seeks to
improve, influential and problematic assumptions that standard empiricism repudiates.13
As I have argued elsewhere, aim-oriented empiricism is a synthesis of, and a great
improvement over, the ideas of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos,14 and leads to the solution of
fundamental problems in the philosophy of science: the problems of induction, the
meaning of theoretical unification, and verisimilitude.15 Aim-oriented empiricism does
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empiricism.16 In moving from standard to aim-oriented empiricist science there is a
profound increase in the scope of scientific knowledge and understanding, in that the
thesis that the universe is physically comprehensible becomes a part of theoretical
scientific knowledge. Aim-oriented empiricism provides a rational, if fallible method for
the discovery of fundamental new theories in physics.17 There are important implications
for education.18 And there are important implications for science, for the history and
philosophy of science, and for the relationship between the two. The philosophy of
science becomes a vital, integral part of natural philosophy.19
6. The Rebirth of Natural Philosophy
A major implication of aim-oriented empiricism is that physicalism is a basic part of
current (conjectural) theoretical scientific knowledge. Physicalism, as understood here,
asserts that the universe is physically comprehensible. It is such that the true physical
“theory of everything” is unified. Some kind of unified pattern of physical law runs
through all phenomena, actual and possible. The 17th century corpuscular hypothesis is
an early, crude version of physicalism.
At once we are confronted with the fundamental problem that so baffled 17th century
philosophers – the problem they failed to articulate properly, and tried to solve with
versions of Cartesian dualism: If physicalism is true, how can our human world, imbued
with sensory qualities, consciousness, free will, meaning and value, exist and best
flourish? If the universe really is more or less as modern physics conceives it to be, what
becomes of the meaning and value of human life?
Natural philosophers of the 17th century – whether proto-scientists or proto-
philosophers, took for granted that the silence of physics about the experiential – colours,
sounds, smells as we experience them, sentience and consciousness as we experience
them – means that all these experiential features do not exist out there in the real,
objective world. For, if they did exist, physics would surely encounter them, predict and
explain their occurrence. But it does not, and so, the argument runs, they do not exist.
All this is a blunder, as I have shown in some detail elsewhere.20 Physics seeks only to
describe, predict and explain what may be called the “causally efficacious” aspect of
things, that aspect which determines how events unfold in time and space. The
experiential, not being “causally efficacious” in the relevant sense, is not mentioned by
physics. Furthermore, in an argument usually attributed to Thomas Nagel and Frank
Jackson21 but actually formulated by me many years earlier,22 I have shown decisively
that physics, and that part of science in principle reducible to physics, cannot predict the
experiential, whether sensory qualities without us, or sensations within us. Furthermore,
if physical theory is extended, by means of additional postulates, to include the
experiential, it thereby drastically loses its astonishing explanatory power.
All this means that, even if experiential features, without us in the world and within us
do exist, we can give good reasons why physics would say nothing about them, and can
explain and understand why physics would say nothing about them. Hence, the silence of
physics about sensory qualities external to us, and sensational qualities internal to us,
provides no grounds whatsoever for holding they do not exist objectively in the world.
It becomes possible to hold that what we see, hear, touch and smell in ordinary
perception really does exist out there in the world. An account of how our human world
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Cartesian dualism – and differs from philosophical doctrines expounded over the
centuries since Descartes’ time. An account of perception emerges which holds that what
we know about most directly in perception is things external to us, not our inner
representation of them. Darwinian theory has a crucial part to play in this general
account, in that Darwinian theory helps explain how and why purposive living things
have come to proliferate so amazingly in our world. Darwinian theory needs, however,
to be reformulated to do justice to the evolution of purposiveness, sentience,
consciousness, free will, meaning and value.23 All in all, we can begin to see how we can
make sense of our human world, imbued with experiential features, consciousness, free
will, meaning and value, even though embedded in the physical universe as understood
by modern science.
The upshot of the arguments of this section and the one before is that we need to
recreate natural philosophy – a synthesis of science and philosophy. Philosophy, in
particular, needs to be transformed so that it takes up its proper task of tackling the
problems for our understanding of ourselves thrown up by what science tells us about the
universe and ourselves. The splitting of natural philosophy into science and philosophy
arose out of intellectual blunders and failings. Once these are put right, it becomes
obvious that natural philosophy needs to be resurrected.
There are profound implications for education. No course in physics, in science, can
be adequate which does not discuss the problems for our understanding of ourselves –
how we can be conscious, free and of value – granted what modern physics, biology and
neuroscience tell us about the universe and ourselves. And no course in philosophy can
be adequate which does not include discussion of what modern science tells us about the
universe and ourselves. All pupils and students need to encounter, and be given
opportunities to explore, our fundamental problem of both life and thought: How can we
exist and best flourish embedded as we are in the physical universe?24
7. How to Save the World
A century after the scientific revolution – which should perhaps be called “the natural
philosophy revolution” – another profound intellectual revolution occurred: The
Enlightenment. The fundamental idea of the Enlightenment – especially the French
Enlightenment – was to learn from scientific progress (progress in knowledge of the new
natural philosophy) how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened world. This is
a profound idea. Unfortunately, in developing and applying this immensely important
idea, the philosophes of the Enlightenment blundered. Instead of trying to help get
progress-achieving methods, generalized from those of science, into personal,
institutional and global life, the philosophes rather sought to apply misconstrued
conceptions of scientific method to the task of improving knowledge about social
phenomena. In effect, they sought to develop social inquiry, not as social methodology or
philosophy, but as social science. This blunder was further developed throughout the 19th
century, and built into academia in the early 20th century with the creation of departments
of social science round the world.
The outcome is what we have, by and large, today: academia devoted primarily to the
acquisition of specialized knowledge. First, knowledge is to be acquired; once acquired,
it can be applied to help solve social problems.
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damagingly irrational. We need a new, more rigorous kind of inquiry which gives
intellectual priority to problems of living, and seeks to get into personal and social life,
and into other institutions besides that of science – into government, industry, agriculture,
commerce, the media, law, education, international relations – hierarchical, progress-
achieving methods, designed to improve problematic aims, arrived at by generalizing the
methods of science. This new kind of inquiry would seek to help humanity learn how to
resolve its conflicts and problems of living in more just, cooperatively rational ways than
at present. Its fundamental intellectual and humanitarian aim would be to help humanity
acquire wisdom – wisdom being the capacity to realize (apprehend and create) what is of
value in life, for oneself and others. Correcting the blunders we have inherited from the
Enlightenment is long overdue.
8. Conclusion
We suffer from two profound, long-standing philosophical disasters – still
unrecognised by philosophers today. The first is our failure to sustain, or recreate,
natural philosophy, a synthesis of science and philosophy. Both science and philosophy
are impoverished as a result. The second is our failure to develop a kind of academic
inquiry rationally devoted to helping people realize what is of value in life. There is no
doubt in my mind that these two failures are inter-linked.
There can hardly be any more important task for academic philosophers than to alert
academic colleagues and the public to the existence of these long-standing
instiutionalized philosophical blunders and, as a consequence, the urgent need for
academic reform.
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